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RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 3562  
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 6181  
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RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 4411  
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 6873  
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 5649  
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 9281  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 154497

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TAGS: [KPKO](#) [PREL](#) [UNSC](#)

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S MEETING WITH U/SYG  
GUEHENNO

Classified by: Deputy Secretary Negroponte - For reasons  
1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) SUMMARY. Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno on November 5 to discuss challenges to UNAMID deployment. U/SYG Guehenno pressed the Deputy Secretary for further U.S. assistance with acquiring the capabilities necessary to make the mission successful, particularly transport helicopters, tactical helicopters, and ground transportation assets. Deputy Secretary Negroponte pressed for immediate deployment of the HSP and pledged that the USG will continue to look for ways to help ensure that the UN has the help it needs from donor countries for deployment of blue helmets to Darfur. END SUMMARY.

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The Importance of UNAMID  
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12. (C) The meeting began with a brief discussion of several UN peacekeeping success stories, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Haiti. U/SYG Guehenno noted that UN troops have also had a positive impact in cases like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where problems continue. Guehenno expressed his view that UN engagement was critical for that country and the Great Lakes region. The remaining challenge, observed Guehenno, was in the greater Horn of Africa (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan). Darfur was the biggest challenge at the moment; failure for UNAMID would undermine hard-won progress in reestablishing confidence in UN peacekeeping.

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The Need for a Mobile Force  
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13. (C) U/SYG Guehenno raised his continued nervousness about the quality of troops and the ambitious task laid out for UNAMID. Even if Sudanese President Bashir agreed to the Secretary General's September 19 letter and the accompanying list of troop contributors, the prospective UNAMID force will be weak. Without additional non-African units, UNAMID will not prove significantly more capable at force projection than AMIS. To make up for the weakness of the force, Guehenno said it was essential to create a highly mobile rapid reaction force that had the equipment necessary to respond forcefully. This led to a discussion of the key capabilities UNAMID lacks, namely 18 utility/transport helicopters, ground transportation

assets, and 6 tactical helicopters (e.g. Apaches or MI-24s.) When Deputy Secretary Negroponte asked about the candidates for delivering these capabilities, Guehenno mentioned South Africa, Nigeria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Argentina, and Brazil. Guehenno stated that only South Africa and Nigeria have a direct interest in the conflict, even if all Member States have a stake in the success of UN peacekeeping. U/SYG Guehenno stated that gunships will likely prove a critical UNAMID component, both practically and symbolically. He alluded to MONUC's success in Congo, where attack helicopters enabled the force to be effective despite terrain far more difficult than Darfur's. Gunships would send a clear message to potential spoilers in the case of another attack like the one on Haskanita camp.

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TCCs and the Chinese Role  
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14. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte suggested that the Chinese could perhaps contribute additional assets. U/SYG Guehenno noted that it would be complicated to use Chinese helicopters given the perceived close relationship between Beijing and Khartoum. On the other hand, Chinese help in persuading Khartoum to accept non-African TCC's is critical. U/SYG Guehenno pointed out that, as Sudan is not a failed state, the mission cannot be forced on them. Troop contributors will not send troops without Sudanese

STATE 00154497 002 OF 002

government approval knowing that Khartoum can sabotage their deployment in a myriad of ways.

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A Final Plea...and a DSRSG?  
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15. (C) Guehenno appealed to the Deputy for help in getting donors to provide the capabilities needed to make the deployment a success. For all of the difficulties, the Sudanese will listen to the U.S. An American as the SRSG or as deputy would have been optimal, Guehenno opined. He noted that there were many influential voices who believed that only the U.S. could convince Khartoum of what is at stake politically, especially given the upcoming 2011 secession referendum in southern Sudan. Deputy Secretary Negroponte noted that Khartoum must be aware of the fact that continued GoS intransigence on Darfur will only feed the Government of Southern Sudan's desire to break away when the vote comes. Guehenno replied that Khartoum remains tactically brilliant, but strategically foolish.

16. (SBU) Participants:

U.S.

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Deputy Secretary John Negroponte  
D Gustavo Delgado  
IO/PSC Doug Wake  
IO/PSC Greg Pollock

UN

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Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno  
Nicholas Birnback (Aide)  
Will Davis (UN Information Center)  
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